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The Acquisition of Evidence for

Criminal Prosecution: Some
Constitutional Premises and
Practices in Transition*
By H. Richard Uviller**
I. INTRODUCTION

Criminal cases are made of evidence, and this essential raw
material is often obtained by reaching across someone's border of
privacy. How and when a citizen's personal security yields to social
purpose is, of course, the concern of the Constitution's fourth
amendment and of those who have tried to give it meaning and
stature in our crime-ridden society. Of overriding importance in
the continuous effort to find the just way has been the great and
original American experiment to enforce the constitutional injunction by an evidentiary penalty known as the exclusionary rule.1
Two decades have now passed since the Supreme Court gave
new life and vastly broader application to the exclusionary rule by
deciding that the fourth amendment demanded that uncommon
evidentiary consequence for its violation.2 The rule of exclusion, of
course, had derogated the common law almost fifty years earlier in
that optimistic era before World War I when a Justice named Day
wrote a case called Weeks. That edict, however, applied only to
federal prosecutions, and even when the search and seizure stan* This Article was prepared for and, in the main part, delivered as a paper at a
Symposium, sponsored by the Vanderbilt Law Review, entitled: "The Crisis in the Criminal
Justice System: Reality or Myth?" The author is grateful to the Review for the opportunity
to participate.
** Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A., Harvard University, 1951; LL.B., Yale

University, 1953. The author is indebted to Ms. Doreen Klein and Mr. Douglas G. Tennant,
both of the Columbia Law School class of 1982, for their research and assistance in compiling the footnotes to this Article.
1. Succinctly put, the "exclusionary rule" decrees that evidence unlawfully acquired
either by a state or government officer, or by his civilian deputy or agent, as well as other
evidence derived therefrom, is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution against the person

aggrieved by the initial illegality.
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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dards of the fourth amendment were applied to the states shortly
after the Second World War, the Supreme Court stayed its hand,
deeming the Weeks v. United States3 exclusionary rule some sort
of special federal "remedy" that need not accompany the fourth
amendment right of security into state courts.4 Thus, those jurisdictions that did not choose to follow Weeks avoided the sting of
mandatory exclusion until that memorable summer solstice in 1961
when Mapp v. Ohio5 came down.
I remember quite clearly that day in June and the month that
followed. Consternation was in plentiful supply. Our New York police obviously would have to relearn a lot of basic procedure, both
sides of the criminal bar would have to read a passel of federal
cases in a hurry, and our judges would need to find phrases to
sound knowledgeable and to make supportable discriminations in a
wholly unfamiliar area. I cranked out a crude summary of federal
search and seizure and suppression law just before the State District Attorney's Association convened for its annual festival of
anecdotes. I had an instant runaway best seller. It was as though
we had made a belated discovery that the fourth amendment applied in the State of New York, and we were almost as surprised as
we were three years later when we discovered that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination had not been applicable
in the State all along.'
Looking back, that period seems a time of incredible naivet6
in law enforcement circles. Despite our general apprehension, we
little suspected the variety and complexity of the issue that lay
ahead. We knew we stood in the doorway of a new era, but we
hardly imagined the years of uncertainty, litigation, more confusion, and more litigation. At nisi prius, pretrial motions and hearings addressed to the admissibility of evidence crowded trial time
off the dockets. State appellate judges learned, sometimes to their
grief, that constitutional law was a regular-and frequently dispositive-ingredient of the criminal process. And the reluctant federal
bench kept one hand busy skimming the cauldron of state law enforcement methods.
During this twenty-year span, the United States Supreme
Court took its share of the burden, arduously and conscientiously
trying to work out a theoretical construct with which to handle the
3.
4.
5.
6.

232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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dazzling array of disorderly fact situations and conflicting policy
demands. Progress has been difficult, and often the drawn lines
wavered and blurred before the ink had fairly dried.
The task of construction and reconstruction continues, of
course, as one hopes it always will. Over the last two terms, however, some abatement has been discernible in the vigor with which
these industrious supreme judicial artisans seize major issues and
hammer out new doctrines. In addition, Justice Potter Stewart, a
veritable Vulcan of the fourth amendment, has laid his mallet
aside. This moment may be an appropriate time for the evolutionist to note some developing doctrinal wrinkles and to attempt to
assess their significance to the genus.
For these purposes, this Article isolates only two of the many
aspects of the Court's labors affecting the acquisition of evidence
for criminal prosecution. The first concerns the allocation of primacy among the values that the exclusionary response to the illegal acquisition of evidence serves: a theoretical choice that may
carry some notable practical consequences. The second requires a
reexamination of the role of the trial court in supervising the
preaccusatory search for evidence in a way that suggests the possible obsolescence of the Supreme Court's ruling credo in the Stewart era.
II.

THE PURPOSES OF EXCLUSION

Twenty years ago, the Court articulated a three-fold set of operative purposes demanding the exclusionary response to violations
by law enforcement officers of the constitutional rights of suspects
and defendants. 7 Without indicating any order or priority, or acknowledging any possibility of incompatibility, the Court decreed
that evidence unlawfully acquired must be excluded (1) to restore
to the party aggrieved his breached "privilege and enjoyment" of
the right of security assured him by the Constitution,8 (2) to discourage contemplated invasions by depriving the offending agency
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961). Although the Court was writing here of
fourth amendment violations, the formulation serves as well to explain the evidentiary consequences of violating the sixth amendment right to counsel or the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. It is interesting to note that Justice Stewart, who
figures so prominently in the development of the exclusionary rule, did not join in the majority opinion in Mapp, believing with Justice Harlan that the case presented an inopportune occasion for the reconsideration of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 367 U.S. at
672 (Stewart, J., memorandum).
8. 367 U.S. at 655-57.
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of the profit of the spoils, 9 and (3) to enhance the dignity of the
criminal justice system by withholding the implicit judicial sanction of lawlessness which admission of the evidence implies."0
Thus, the Court wedded the remedial and deterrent purposes to
the interests of judicial integrity to form the inspiring tripod upon
which to build the elaborate catechism that the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule was to become.
Together, these purposes made a handsome and serviceable
group. One might call the remedial purpose traditional or jurisprudential: the illegally injured will have recompense; the wrongfully
deprived will be made whole. Preclusion of use accords a belated
substitute-if not an equivalent-for the wrongly breached security. Moreover, under this compensatory principle, the remedy belongs only to the wronged, and so it may be cited to explain the
Court's continued acceptance of the rule on standing."
The deterrent principle has a more prosaic lineage. It is a
pragmatic policy that is behavioristically aimed at improving official investigatory technique. Social engineering is not infra dignitatem for the Nine Mentors. To an activist Court, putting "teeth"
in the fourth amendment means baring the fang to the would-be
trespasser. In the service of this instructive purpose, the Court has
allowed the evidentiary use of remote or unforeseen acquisitions of
lawless invasion, since such secondary exclusion could produce but
a marginal increment in the deterrent effect of the principal refusal.1 2 Finally, the whole is bathed in the righteous light of judi9. Id. at 657-58.
10. Id. at 659.
11. In the past, the Court never insisted that only the aggrieved party could suppress

the evidence. States have been free to abolish the requirement of standing, and at least one
has done so. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). Moreover, on occasion, the Court itself has broadened the class of persons who may seek suppression. See, e.g.,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). Most recently, the Court has come to the

view that the matter of standing is not distinct from the merits of the motion to suppress,
since exclusion will be granted only on a showing that the moving party's personal and
protected expectations of privacy were defeated by the search and seizure. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois,

439 U.S. 128 (1978). This obverse-of-the-right reasoning appears to translate what once was
the separate and threshold doctrine of standing into an element of the constitutional right
itself. Thus, the limitation of the remedy to those aggrieved may now be inherent, though
not yet articulated, under the fourth amendment.
12. In refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, for example,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), applied this pragmatic calculus and concluded that the costs of suppression outweighed the marginal advancement of the exclusionary rule's prophylactic purpose:

Any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to
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cial dignity. The choice of exclusion summons patriotic pride and
elevates the American court system above the lawless foraging of
the lesser elements of the law enforcement process. By declining a
place in the jury's consideration to facts obtained in a less than
fully honorable fashion, the law might be an even more highly
respected teacher of the best of our heritage. 13
One of the phenomena this Article addresses is the following:
In the last several years, the Court has sorted out these occasionally discordant triple principles and arrived at an important congrand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence of police misconduct
may result from the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly further that goal. Such an extension would deter only police investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury
investigation. . . . We therefore decline to embrace a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct at the
expense of substantially impeding the role of the grand jury.
Id. at 351-52.
The Supreme Court has employed the same analysis in numerous fourth amendment
cases. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court refused to extend collateral review
of search-and-seizure claims to state prisoners, concluding that,
[t]o be sure, each case in which such claim is considered may add marginally to an
awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to
believe, however, that the overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule would be
appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in federal
habeas corpus review of state convictions. . . . Even if one rationally could assume
that some additional incremental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases,
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth Amendment rights
would be out-weighed by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational
system of criminal justice.
Id. at 493-94; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (societal costs of excluding
evidence illegally seized by state officers in federal court proceeding sufficiently outweigh
any deterrent effect on state police); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)(retroactive
application of Mapp refused because exclusion of evidence at such a late date would not
serve deterrent purpose.).
13. The following lines in Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), have themselves become a document in the archives of American cultural history.
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government
of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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clusion of priority. The winner: deterrence. 14 Justice Powell accomplished this resolution through a rather odd, protozoan
amalgamation: the deterrent purpose simply absorbed the remedial. Thus, the Justice wrote:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the
privacy of the search victim .... Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct .... In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved. 15

Apart from its obvious significance to the very cases that expressed the primacy of the deterrence value, the emergence of this
idea portends a major shift in the operation of the exclusionary
rule. Not since the counterrevolutionaries first set up a chant to
"repeal" the exclusionary rule has the prospect of the rule's demise
seemed so bright. While members of the Court repeatedly have expressed doubt and dissatisfaction over the supposed educational
worth of the evidentiary consequence of official transgression,1 the
Court-to the surprise of many jurophiles 1 7 has proved stubbornly resistant to discarding outright a doctrine with so much
mileage on it. At the same time, the Justices seem to have been
quietly paving the way to a vital modification: evidence, though
unlawfully obtained, may be admitted if the police officers reasonably believed they were conducting the investigation in compliance
with constitutional restraints."8 The logic is clear and compelling:
14. The effectiveness of exclusion as a deterrent to unlawful police acquisition has
been debated often, but neither demonstrated nor disproved. Indeed, in at least one case,
the Supreme Court held that the rule was an ineffective deterrent. See Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960); accord United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453 (1976). For
a recent, scholarly, and thorough-if purposeful-discussion of the deterrence rationale, see
Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L. Rav. 365, 389 n.116, 394-400, et passim
(1981).
15. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
16. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2851 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 492 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
17. Among those waiting in vain for the demise of the rule have been Justices Brennan
and Marshall. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J., with
Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
with Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551 (1975) (Brennan,
J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
18. In his dissent in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975), Justice White explicitly
advocated an exception to the exclusionary rule when an officer seized evidence "in the
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it is sheer foolishness to try to deter a police officer from taking an
action that he truly believes, with good reason, to be perfectly
proper. 19
As a matter of policy, the "good faith exception"-as it has
been dubbed-is more than a sop to the disenchanted. While retaining the sanction of exclusion for the flagrant or willful
abuse-the sort normally addressed by punishment-it largely unburdens the system of unwanted acquittals based on less than all
the relevant and probative evidence. An actual and reasonable, albeit erroneous, belief that a search and seizure is a proper and legal action probably describes a fairly high proportion of police activity resulting in the acquisition of evidence. Surely, little is
gained in terms of enhanced judicial integrity by rejecting some
item of probative evidence that an officer obtained, for example, on
the reasonable belief that a person of competent authority had
good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and [he has] reasonable
grounds for this belief." Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the Stone majority opinion, suggested that overruling the exclusionary rule, or "limiting its scope to egregious, bad-faith conduct," would inspire legislatures to develop new remedies for persons injured by police misconduct. Id. at
501 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Burger agreed with White's observation that the exclusionary
rule constitutes a "senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth in many criminal trials" and
noted White's suggestion that the rule should not be applied when an officer acts in good
faith. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
In United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1974), Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that if the exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct, it
should be applied "only if it can be said that the law enforcement official had knowledge, or
may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 542.
Similarly, in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1974), Justice Powell, concurring in part,
stated that when the officer has not engaged in willful or negligent conduct depriving the
defendant of some right, "the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule does not obtain,
and I can see no legitimate justification for depriving the prosecution of reliable and probative evidence." Id. at 612. (Powell, J., concurring in part).
Justice Blackmun, in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), noted parenthetically
that application of the exclusionary rule in that case would have resulted in the "frustration
of the Los Angeles police officers' good-faith duties as enforcers of the criminal laws," but he
seemed to suggest that if the rule's deterrent value is strong enough, it should be applied.
Id. at 453.
Justice O'Connor appears to be amenable to some limitation of the exclusionary rule
when an officer makes a good faith, "technical error." Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (Sept. 9,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] cited in Mertens & Wasserstrom, supranote 14, at 370
n.32 (1981).
19. A government task force based its recommended adoption of a good faith exception in large part upon the strength of this argument. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1981).
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spontaneously invited him to search premises or seize goods.2"
Moreover, the subsequent discovery that the host in fact lacked
the capacity to consent does little, as a matter of ordinary fairness
and common sense, retroactively to brand the officer's conduct a
transgression. 2 ' Similarly, one would suppose that police who
soundly though mistakenly believe that the perpetrator of a recent
and dangerous crime has fled into some enclosure could not be deterred from hot pursuit by the subsequent discovery of their factual error. 22 Therefore, exclusion of such incriminating items as
they may stumble upon within would not serve the purpose of the
fourth amendment rule. In short, the good faith exception to the
rule of exclusion appears to comport well with good sense in service of the prime object of deterrence.
Indeed, scholars may claim that the Supreme Court has already adopted a good faith doctrine in at least two cases, 23 but the
20. Of course, the matter of operative consent to search and seizure is complex and
subtle. What appears to be a voluntary and conscious invitation may be nothing but the
inoperative acquiescence to ostensible authority, and uniquely, the prosecution bears the
burden of proving otherwise. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). Moreover, on
the question of actual voluntariness, the invitor's awareness of his right of refusal, his custodial circumstance, and other factors possibly impairing his freedom of choice are to be considered in "totality," without clear or automatic rules. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973). The invitor's actual competence to surrender an absent third party's right to
protected security is not always clear from the invitor's relationship to the premises, to the
seized object, or to the other party. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974);
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
21. The Supreme Court thus far has declined to erode fourth amendment protections
by "strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority.'" Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. at 488. Indeed, in United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164 (1974), the Court expressly avoided the issue, stating:
Accordingly, we do not reach another major contention of the United States in bringing
this case here: that the Government in any event had only to satisfy the District Court
that the searching officers reasonably believed that Mrs. Graff had sufficient authority
over the premises to consent to the search.
Id. at 177 n.14.
At least one state court, however, has adopted outright the apparent-authority justification. In People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 442 N.E.2d 537, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1981), police were
approached, invited, escorted, and admitted to the defendant's apartment by a woman they
had reason to believe enjoyed joint residence. The arsenal to which she led them was not
suppressed, even though it turned out that the woman had no actual right to authorize the
search and seizure.
22. Entry and search were approved as a matter of constitutional law in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). For a discussion of the possible consequences of "factual error," see infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
23. In Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), Detroit police arrested the defendant pursuant to a City Code provision that required persons subjected to an investigatory
stop to produce identification. An incidental search turned up "controlled substances."
Holding the arrest lawful, the Supreme Court refused to require that the "prudent officer"
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Court has not yet openly acknowledged it, and most circuits and
states have not gotten the message. Recently, the Court had the
opportunity and declined to consider the good faith exception directly in a case many thought had been expertly fashioned as a
vehicle for rolling out the new doctrinal era with suitable fanfare.
With twenty-four judges sitting and the Rebel flags flying, the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seceded from the Circuitry
and adopted a good faith exception for themselves. 4 The Supreme
Court denied review. 25 The Second and the Ninth Circuits have

flirted with the notion, but neither has yet embraced good faith as
a true exception to the exclusionary rule. 26 The Supreme Court,
however, need not choose a case in which the lower court bought
the good faith exception. From the cases of reluctance and hesita-

tion, as well as from the decisions refusing to allow the exception,
the Court at this very moment will be served many juicy grapes

ripening on state and federal vines.
This assertion is not intended to suggest that the Court will be
unable to resist the temptation, or, even if it plucks one of these
anticipate the subsequent judicial declaration that the Code provision was unconstitutional.
Id. at 38-39.
Similarly, in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), a "roving border patrol" unit
seized a large quantity of marijuana from a car four months before the Supreme Court in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) ruled that such searches were unconstitutional. Reviewing the Court's decisions dealing with the retroactive application of new
constitutional interpretations, Justice Rehnquist for the majority stated:
The teaching of these retroactivity cases is that if the law enforcement officers
reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial,
the "imperative of judicial integrity" is not offended by the introduction into evidence
of that material even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have broadened
the exclusionary rule to encompass evidence seized in that manner.
Id. at 537.
24. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). For a thorough
description and discussion of the Williams case, see Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14,
at 411-16; Note, Good Faith and the Exclusionary Rule: Demise of the Exclusion Illusion,
30 Am. U.L. REV. 863 (1981).
25. The Court denied certiorari without comment. 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). To some the
denial must have seemed a good opportunity lost, but the Court might have been courteously waiting for Justice O'Connor to take her seat before tackling so important an issue.
Moreover, Williams included an alternative ground which may have detracted from the purity of the issue of principal interest. Thus, a plurality of the court of appeals found it
unnecessary to carve out a new exception to the exclusionary rule because the search was
permissible as incident to a valid arrest. 622 F.2d at 839.
26. United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 556 n.11 (9th Cir. 1981) (for purposes of
determining the attenuation of taint, the trial court should consider whether the actions of
DEA agents "were indicative of good faith on their part or whether the agents' actions were
more egregious"); United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[i]n various ways, the [issue] of. . . good faith will undoubtedly enter into the court's handling of
the exclusionary rule").
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morsels, that the outcome of its digestion is predictable. The good
faith exception, however-which Professor Charles A. Wright of
Texas endorsed a decade ago 27 -remains an appetizing release in
several respects. A majority of the Court doubts the premises of
the exclusionary rule, believes that the rule's efficacy remains unproven and unprovable, and regards as dangerously high the consequential cost in societal terms. 2s Nevertheless, these Justices con27. Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 Tax. L. REv.
736 (1972).
28. At least two of the current justices appear to be willing to discard the exclusionary
rule. In California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979), Chief Justice Burger joined with Justice
Rehnquist in dissenting from the Court's denial of stay, stating that the stay should have
been granted to permit the parties to brief the issue "whether, and to what extent" the
exclusionary rule should be retained. Id. at 928 (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Minjares emphasized that the exclusionary rule "imposes
tremendous costs on the judicial process at criminal trials and on direct review." Id. at 919
(Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting). He indicated that the costs of applying the
exclusionary rule include diverting the focus of the trial from the central issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence and excluding evidence that is typically reliable and "often the
most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Id. at 919
(Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-91
(1976)). He went on to suggest that it would be "quite rational. . . for the criminal trial to
take place either without any application of the exclusionary rule in either federal or state
cases, or at least without any application in state cases." Id. at 927 (Rehnquist, J., with
Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In Robbins v. California, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2851 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Rehnquist emphasized his concern that the law applying the fourth amendment does not articulate clear rules and suggested that federal law enforcement personnel are more highly
trained than their state counterparts to "wrestl[e] with this Court's twisting and turning as
it makes decisional law applying the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 2855. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He concluded that "little is lost in the way of the 'core values' of the Fourth
Amendment as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth if Mapp v. Ohio is overruled." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), focused on the costs that the
exclusionary rule imposes on society in the form of "the release of countless guilty
criminals." Id. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He emphasized that this "high price" is not
justified in view of the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the rule's deterrent effect.
Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring), Burger further suggested that an additional problem with the exclusionary rule
is that its "continued existence. . . as presently implemented, inhibits the development of
rational alternatives." Id. at 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
In contrast with Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Stone
assumed, "[d]espite the absence of supportive empirical evidence . . . that the immediate
effect of exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth
Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 492. Justice Powell, however,
has expressed concern about the costs which the exclusionary rule imposes on society, stating that in some circumstances, "strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deterrent purposes." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1974) (Powell, J.,
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tinue to consider rescission an unattractive solution. In their view,
a deft incision might be preferable, particularly if the effect would
be the preservation of unlawfully acquired evidence without the
renunciation of the exclusionary principles. Deterrable, flagrant
transgressions would be punished by exclusion of the gains; only
the undeterrable, conscientious, good faith, and reasonably
founded errors would pass the evidentiary test.
Nevertheless, unknown demons lurk behind these apparent
virtues. Let us be wary. At the end of the garden path we may find
ourselves in a thornbush-or perhaps back where we started. Indeed, the emphasis of this Article is on the following proposition:
The promise of clarity, of reasonable accommodation of conflicting
values, of logical obedience to prime values, of sensible appreciation for the realities of police work, and of all the other immensely
attractive promises of the good faith modification may conceal new
problems at least as ornery as the old. The judicial task may be at
concurring in part). Justice Powell also has suggested that under some circumstances, the
"deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule does not obtain." Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part). In cases in which the rule's "underlying premise" of willful or negligent
police misconduct is lacking, Justice Powell would see "no legitimate justification for depriving the prosecution of reliable and probative evidence." Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part).
Justice White's articulation of a good faith exception in his Stone dissent reflects his
concern that "in many of its applications the exclusionary rule was not advancing [its deterrent aim] in the slightest, and that in this respect it was a senseless obstacle to arriving at
the truth in many criminal trials." 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). White suggested
that when a police officer acts mistakenly but in good faith, exclusion of the evidence will
have "no deterrent effect . . . and the only consequence of the rule as presently administered is that unimpeachable and probative evidence [will be] kept from the trier of fact and
the truth-finding function of proceedings [will be] substantially impaired or a trial totally
aborted." Id. at 540 (White, J., dissenting). White concluded that "[t]he exclusionary rule
. . . seriously shortchanges the public interest as presently applied," and, therefore, he
would modify it. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1975), Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
acknowledged the "substantial cost [that the exclusionary rule imposes] on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence." Id. at
448-49 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). Blackmun also acknowledged the lack of empirical
evidence demonstrating the rule's deterrent effect, stating that the debate within the Court
"has been unaided, unhappily, by any convincing empirical evidence on the effects of the
rule." Id. at 446. He noted the difficulty of attempting an empirical study of the rule, since
"[t]he number of variables is substantial, and many cannot be measured or subjected to
effective controls." Id. at 450-51. Accordingly, Blackmun reached no conclusion on the question whether the exclusionary rule serves a deterrent purpose; rather he based his holding in
Janis on alternative premises, stating that if the exclusionary rule does promote deterrence,
then the marginal effect of applying it in that case "does not outweigh the cost to society of
extending the rule to that situation." Id. at 453-54. On the other hand, if the exclusionary
rule "does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation
is unwarranted." Id. at 454.
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least as artificial, the consumption of calendar space equally as
egregious.
The lynchpin of the good faith exception is the officer's
soundly premised, though erroneous belief that his action comports with law and the Constitution. More specifically, the policeman acting in good faith believes that thrusting his body or hand
or eye or ear into some otherwise private enclosure, large or small,
is justified by his sense of urgency, his benevolent purpose, the certainty of his expectation of success, or some other circumstances
preceding his entry.
So far, so good. But a court will have to review the policeman's
judgment: was the sense of rectitude, however sincere, legally
sound? Was the officer's decision framed with sufficient awareness
and consideration of the principles protecting the subject against
the official inspection? Moreover, what are those principles to
which the reasonable police officer must defer in the exercise of
"objectively" approved good faith? Are they anything less than or
different from the set of standards for lawful warrantless searches
and seizures that the Court has been hammering out over the past
two decades or more? If the admissibility of the evidence depends
on the police officer's actual or supposed knowledge or understanding of finely wrought constitutional decisions of the courts, then
the uncertainty and complexity of today's exclusionary determination has not only been perpetuated into the new era, it has been
compounded. For, under the good faith standard, the reviewing
court must determine not only whether the police search on the
29
or to
landlady's invitation was closer to Stoner v. California
3
0
United States v. Matlock, but also whether the officer had a reasonable basis for believing that he had competent Matlockian consent. Police training programs, regulations, and general intelligence
and literacy must be taken into account in judging whether a police officer could have made the sophisticated decision whether the
33
ChadwickslRobbins8 2 line, rather than the Carroll IChambers4
29. 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (invitation of hotel clerk who voluntarily used room key to
open suspect's room for police held inoperative).
30. 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (valid consent to search room tendered by woman who claimed
she occupied it "jointly" with defendant).
31. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981) (closed opaque container found inside
a vehicle cannot be searched without a warrant pursuant to the "automobile exception").
33. Carroll v. United States, 26 U.S. 132 (1925).
34. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (a vehicle which could have been
searched when first stopped may be searched later after it has been immobilized under pol-
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line, controls the search of a paper bag in the back of a van
stopped on probable cause.
We can avoid the nightmare of litigating and resolving the incessant questions of whether a patrolman could have reasonably
believed that he was legally entitled to do what he did. Deliverance
comes in this form: Let us not require police officers to know the
court-crafted categories of permissible searches without warrant,
and let us not interpret "reasonable police belief of propriety" as
the equivalent of a correctly anticipated judicial conclusion of legality. By "propriety," rather, let us mean "appropriate restraint."
Thus, we shall say that a police officer acted in good faith when,
under the particular facts that he knew or reasonably believed to
be true he acted without undue haste, without excessive intrusion,
and in a manner reasonably calculated to achieve an appropriate
result under the circumstances. From this or a similar formulation,
the single descriptive word is irresistible: he acted in good faith if
his action was "reasonable."
To press the simple and familiar standard of reasonableness
into service to describe the underlying principle of admissibility
gives an odd and perhaps disquieting jolt to established doctrine.
In a sense, it grants supremacy to a minority faction of the Court
which I identify with Justice White, who has long contended that
the fourth amendment demands only that a search and seizure
without warrant be "reasonable. 3 5 Justice Stewart's majority generally has prevailed with the view that the first clause of the fourth
amendment expresses a preference for the magisterial route, and
thus a warrantless search and seizure may be justified only if it
falls within certain delineated and recognized exceptional categories. 6 By shifting the exclusionary determinant to the wellfounded belief of the searching officer, and by ruling on that determination with the flexible measure of reasonableness, the categorical approach must yield to the ad hoc. And in essence the
Frankfurter/Harlan idea of due process will rule the fourth
87
amendment.
icy custody).
35. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).

36. As Justice Stewart himself has stated, "searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).

37. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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In this posture, of course, the notion of good faith proves totally superfluous. A simple shift from Stewart's to White's interpretation achieves the same result with considerably less fanfare.
The White view, of course, requires courts to make a case-by-case,
circumstantial analysis, with a consequent reduction in predictability. But predictability has not been a great boast of the categorical
approach, and historically our system has not fared badly on the
results of circumstantial jurisprudence and the projection of
particularities.
If unadorned and circumstantial reasonableness remains an
unattractive standard and the glitter of good faith proves irresistible, we might still save ourselves by some cautious discriminations
at the outset. Let us reserve this exception for those comparatively
easy cases that fit the good faith model. For this purpose, we must
look more closely at the putative violations and attempt some suitable categorization. Notwithstanding eminent views to the contrary, the distinction probably should not be cast in terms of "flagrant" versus "technical" transgressions of protected rights." Most
obviously, flagrancy is frequently in the eye of the beholder-in
this case, a post facto judicial beholder to whom certain protections may seem stronger or clearer than they appear to the deterrable constable on the scene. Rather, constabulary errors should be
divided into errors of fact and of law.3 9 A police officer who erroneously believes that the infamous "automobile exception"'4 0 entitles
him to look into a paper bag in the rear of a van parked in a police
garage has made a mistake of law. The officer who mistakenly
thinks that the woman who admits him with a key and leads him
38. Justice Powell, concurring in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610 (1975) (Powell, J.,
with Rehnquist, J., concurring), contended that "flagrantly abusive violation of Fourth
Amendment rights, on the one hand, and 'technical' Fourth Amendment violations, on the
other . .. call for significantly different judicial responses." Id. at 610. Justice O'Connor,
too, has indicated an inclination to act differently when the fourth amendment violation
alleged is a good faith "technical error." See Hearings, supra note 18, at 195.
39. Professor Ball suggested a distinction between errors of fact and of law some four
years ago. See Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable"Exception
to the ExclusionaryRule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978). The Fifth Circuit cited
Ball's analysis in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
and Mertens & Wasserstrom discussed it in their recent article. Mertens & Wasserstrom,
supra note 14, at 424. Whether Ball's categories are precisely coterminous with the ones
expressed in this Article, however, is not altogether clear.
40. The so-called "automobile exception" has had a tortuous career from Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), through New York v. Belton, 449 U.S. 1109 (1981).
Predicated on the inherent mobility of the vehicle and the reduced expectation of privacy
concerning its contents, the exception has tolerated searches and seizures of its interiors in a
variety of situations.
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to the defendant's bloody boots is a lawful occupant of shared
premises has made an error of fact. A reviewing court can determine whether the latter was an objectively good faith misapprehension far more easily than it can assess the appropriate level of
legal sophistication that is necessary to understand the guiding law
in the first example. Thus, a court could consider whether the facts
as known to the officer strongly suggested the factual conclusion he
reached, whether he should have inquired further, and whether
ambiguities in the perceived situation were resolved in a manner
consistent with ordinary police experience. These and the like are
questions commonly put to and readily resolved by judges. Upon
their resolution, a court can decide whether the subjective belief
was objectively warranted, and whether factual good faith may excuse the factual error. Thus, let us reserve the good faith excuse
for those cases in which the error was one of fact. A police officer's
errors of law are not susceptible to objective good faith appraisal
and must be resolved under conventional standards. 41
The most onerous aspect of this proposed limitation of the
good faith exception is the ever-uncertain line between fact and
law. And the search and seizure carried out pursuant to a defective
warrant provides perhaps the most prominent fact/law puzzle. Is
the officer's belief in the validity of the warrant an error of fact or
of law? On the one hand, one might argue that it was a factual
error because the officer thought the document was something that
it was not-a valid order. On the other hand, perhaps it was a mistake of law because his belief in its validity or his ability to recognize its invalidity required some legal sophistication. The argument over this question easily could result in a stalemate. The
matter is closely akin to the unconstitutional Detroit ordinance in
Michigan v. DeFillippo.42 While approving the "prudent" officer's
41. Mertens and Wasserstrom argue against the adoption of a good faith exception
partly because the exception would stifle the development of fourth amendment law. Citing
a string of important decisions, they claim that these cases would not be in the literature
because they dealt with "police misconduct that could have been excused under a good faith
exception." Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 371. Since the thesis of this Article is
that the police errors in those cases-and in most cases in which a major constitutional

point deserves litigation-are mistakes in judgment of legality, rather than simple misapprehensions of fact, the officer's transgressions should not be excused on the ground that he
had some basis for his belief in the lawfulness of his action. In some cases the "good faith
error of fact" is subsumed in the ordinary finding of probable cause. If a police officer sees
what he reasonably but erroneously believes to be the butt of a gun protruding from the
pocket of a person in line at the bank, his arrest of the person will be lawful on probable
cause and the incident search that turns up drugs will be valid.
42.

443 U.S. 31 (1979).
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reliance on its presumptive validity, the Supreme Court in DeFillippo offered little guidance concerning whether his error was one
of law or of fact. One could analyze the decision as a finding that,
although an unconstitutional statute is void, the officer's factual
error in believing it to be operative was excusable as the product of
appropriate good faith reliance on ostensible legality. Or, it might
be viewed as a finding that, notwithstanding the officer's legal error, his conduct was not unreasonable in light of the circumstances.
These alternative readings of DeFillippo may suggest a satisfactory solution to the defective warrant puzzle in terms of the result of the law/fact election. Regardless of the warrant's legal validity, errors that an executing officer may make concerning the
issuance or terms of the warrant are errors of fact.4 3 Thus, if a police officer who sincerely believed he was properly conducting his
mission relied upon a document nude of the magisterial subscription, or if he seized property not described in the warrant, or
searched the wrong premises, or if he executed a daytime warrant
at nighttime, he has made an error of fact, and, without undue or
unaccustomed burden, a reviewing court can assess whether he had
a good faith basis for his mistake.
On the other hand, if the warrant turns out to be legally
flawed even though it was faithfully executed according to its
terms, the officer's mistaken reliance on it must be termed an error
of law. In cases that deal with errors of law, good faith becomes
irrelevant, since we should not inquire into the level of legal acumen that is necessary for police officers to misapprehend legal import in bad faith. With this consideration dismissed, the question
reverts to the court to determine by conventional methods. Such a
determination, of course, may be pursued under White's rather
than Stewart's rubric, but in either case it proceeds unencumbered
by the good faith shift.
This analysis leaves us with the issue of the deterrence pri43.

The applicant officer's errors also may be termed errors of fact for these purposes.

Thus, the same good faith standard should be employed to assess omissions, falsifications,
and misstatements of fact in the application. At this point, good faith crosses the path of
another developing idea in the law of warrants. Generally, most courts were reluctant until
recently to examine beyond the four corners of both the sworn application for the search
warrant and the warrant itself. Errors-even lies-by affiants did not affect the validity of
the facially sufficient warrant. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Court cited a
shifting trend among state courts to allow these challenges, though on a rather strictly limited basis. Some jurisdictions responded by either facilitating challenge or broadening the
effects of successful contravention. See, e.g., People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 538 P.2d 130, 148
Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978).
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macy in resolving the defective warrant problem. The exclusionary
rule exists primarily to teach police to take their hunches to the
neutral and detached magistrate; excluding the results of the
learned lesson hardly reinforces the message. As long as the beam
of deterrence focuses narrowly on police, excluding the product of
the well-executed warrant because of defects unknown to the officer seems counterproductive. But if the beam catches in its scope
the magistrates as well, exclusion becomes the only means for review and instruction of the offending official. Unreviewable and irreversible judicial errors of this magnitude offend justice. Moreover, local and inferior court judges may well be more readily
conditioned by evidentiary consequences in higher courts than are
police officers. As more police officers learn to come to magistrates,
the magistrates themselves will require more careful control to
teach them to pay close attention to the quantum of cause, to the
reliability of informants, to precision in describing object and
place, and the like.
In sum, the dominance of the value of deterrence, applied
broadly to judicial as well as to police officers, should yield a good
faith exception to the rule of exclusion for errors of fact made in
reasonable good faith. Evidence that is procured in ignorance or
disregard of legal restraint or in the legally erroneous belief of rectitude-either by warrantless police or by warrant-issuing
judges-should be excluded if the conduct was unreasonable under
the circumstances. In weighing the reasonableness of a legal error,
of course, the magistrate must be held to a high standard of legal
sophistication, while the field officer should be judged by the ordinary considerations of appropriate respect for the citizen's rights of
security balanced against the exigency of the situation.
Ill.

THE ACQUIsIToRY PROCESS

In addition to the impending doctrinal shift toward the flexible, circumstantial assessments of reasonableness and good faith
consequent upon the clear emergence of deterrence as the prime
purpose of the exclusionary rule, Stewart's categorical analysis may
suffer incursions of a different sort: "technological" innovation.
Stewart's construction of the single, rather oddly evolved sentence
that is the fourth amendment-the reading that has come to dominate search and seizure doctrine over the last twenty years-is
founded on the proposition that in the normal course, the decision
to breach a citizen's privacy should not be given to field officers.
Thus, however sound his reason for believing a probe will be fruit-
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ful, and however worthy the purpose of the probe, the eager enforcement officer must take his case first to a detached judicial officer, articulate his reasons for the search under oath, and get
advance, ex parte permission to puncture the precious veil of
security.
No one claims, however, that this warrant mode-important
as it is-constitutes the exclusive means of access to evidence lying
within protected regions. All agree that exceptional circumstances
justify lawful search and seizure without prior warrant. In the difficult business of describing these special categories, a couple of thematic principles have emerged. First is the idea that the entitled
party may relinquish or surrender interests in security, and observing officers may gather the item or intelligence sought without constitutional offense. Thus, words spoken either in public 4 or in misplaced reliance on a confederate's loyalty,45 an undercover agent's
disguise, incriminating items discarded with the trash, v or things
found following a competent and freely tendered invitation to look
around, 48 are lawfully acquired as evidence without warrant. Despite the Court's denial, this group of categories more nearly resembles waived rights than exceptional licenses to penetrate intact
49
privacy.
A second theme running through a group of exceptions to the
requirement of warrant appears in those cases in which either the
police are clearly acting for a purpose other than criminal investigation or they have no reason to expect that a particular item of
evidence will be discovered during their otherwise lawful activity.
Thus, a police officer going to the aid of a sick or distressed person
need not overlook evidence exposed to his view, 5° nor need officers
apply for a warrant to perform a routine investigatory inspection
of an impounded automobile. 51 The warrant procedure is obviously
inappropriate for the incidental and inadvertent discovery of evi44. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection").
45. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
46. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
47. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
48. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
49. See, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Haley, 581 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1978).
51. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968).
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dence of a crime.52
Putting aside the voluntary surrenders of security and the inadvertent discoveries during otherwise lawful quests or noncriminal investigations, we are left with the heart of the matter and the
major theme uniting the true and principal exceptions to the warrant preference rule: exigency. The exigency principle holds that
the time-consuming magisterial route may be bypassed only when
some defined variety of special urgency necessitates more direct
and expeditious access to the evidence. The search of an automobile, which is a "fleeting target" on the highway,53 the search of
"grabbable space" around a person at the time of or moments after
his lawful arrest,"' the search in hot pursuit of a fleeing armed
felon, 55 and the pat down of a suspect momentarily detained for
preliminary questioning" are a few examples of the operation of
the exigency principle.
Obviously, the factual premise upon which the principle
swings is the normally slow and awkward mechanics of the warrant
procedure. As conventionally employed, the warrant application
procedure requires a police officer to sit down at a typewriter and
laboriously peck out all his reasons for seeking access. Oftentimes,
a supervisor or specially assigned officer or member of the prosecutor's staff must review and perhaps revise the document. It then
must be physically produced before a judge, specially roused or
pried away from his or her calendar, who-one hopes-will read,
consider, and perhaps even amplify the application before signing
52. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 482 (1971). The happenstance/plainview exception, however, will not apply to the chance discovery of crime during a routine or
random inspection for health or safety violations. Since overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359

U.S. 360 (1959), the Court has decreed that the warrant procedure must be followed in these
situations. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

As Stewart repeatedly has insisted, however, exigency alone will not suffice; the exigency exception must be recognized and delineated as a particular category such as "hot
pursuit" or "incident to lawful arrest." See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94
(1978) (rejection of "murder scene" exception created by the state court); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969) (search incident to lawful arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298-300 (1967) (hot pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (im-

minent threat of destruction of evidence).
53.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Subsequent decisions applying the

automobile exception theory to immobilized vehicles have diluted the concept of exigency
that is inherent in the mobility of the vehicle. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58

(1967).
54. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
55.
56.

Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:501

a carefully drafted warrant. A couple of hours seems pretty expeditious for the operation, but more than the "urgent" situation can
afford.
Not only time, but also effort and professional dignity, must
be factored into the warrant procedure. For the sweaty cop who
has just captured the elusive and resistant quarry as he emerged
from his hideout, to post a guard, return to the barracks, shift
gears, and sit down to type a warrant application to get permission
to do what he knows he should do-go in and scour the hideout-must seem a perverse, unnecessary, and perhaps demeaning
effort. To avoid it, the police officer will try to stretch an exception
already recognized by Stewart and Co. (perhaps hot pursuit) or
else, let's face it, he will stretch a fact or two-for example, by
testifying that he captured the villain just inside rather than just
outside the lair-to make his action appear lawful. This factor of
efforts of compliance consequently accounts for much of the stress
that accompanies the task of defining and redefining the categorical exceptions to reach a closer accord with urgency as it is perceived in the field.
When we begin to consider problems of time and effort, we are
ripe for the advent of technological solutions. In this instance, the
required technology is not very exotic: telephones. The Federal
Rules allow it; 57 California 8 likes it; four other states appear to use
it, with or without statutory provisions;5 9 and a number of other
jurisdictions are becoming interested. The fourth amendment says
that an officer must swear to the averments. The written affidavit
naturally becomes the form. But the Constitution does not say that
57. FED. R. CraM. P. 41(c)(2).
58. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1526, 1528 (West Supp. 1982). For a preliminary report on its
use, see Heisse, Warrantless Automobile Searches and Telephonic Search Warrants:
Should the "Automobile Exception" be Redrawn?, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1031, 1034

(1980).
59. ARIZ. REv.

STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3914, 13-3915 (1978); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRim. R. 2.3.
Louisiana and Minnesota apparently use the procedure without benefit of statute. Louisiana
v. Dupris, 378 So. 2d 934 (La. 1979); Minnesota v. Andries, 297 N.W.2d 124 (Minn. 1980). In
New York, § 690.35(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law provides: "An application for a search
warrant must be in writing and must be made, subscribed and sworn to by a public servant
.... "N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 690.35(1) (Consol. 1971). In People v. Brown, 40 N.Y.2d
183, 352 N.E.2d 545, 386 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1976), however, a police officer, after being sworn,
orally presented his application for a search warrant to a state supreme court justice, and a
court reporter recorded his statements. The New York Court of Appeals found that the
officer had substantially complied with § 690.35(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law, since the
oral presentation was recorded, and, therefore, a writing existed that was made while the
officer was under oath. This case, however, has not been taken as general authority for a
remote issuance procedure.
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the sworn application must be in writing. Of course, the applicant's
recital, as well as the court's responsive order, must be in reviewable form, but this requirement does not present any great problem. With a little common electronic magic, a police officer can call
from a car radio or public phone, have a twenty-four hour judge
summoned to a recorded line in minutes, and a vocal deposition
and oral authorization may be taped and executed before the
words have been transcribed.6 0 Such instant and virtually on-thescene availability of the magistrate should undercut substantially
the predicate of the urgency exceptions and reduce the necessity of
their constant refinement and redefinition. For this development
we should all be grateful, even those of us who make our living
trying to explain the categorical incrustations.
At the same time, the technical solution provides a much more
gratifying alternative to the cries for repeal of the rule of evidentiary exclusion. By turning field officers increasingly to the accelerated warrant mode as a matter of routine, we honor the warrant
60. Many observers believe that an indispensable component of the search warrant
process is the warrant itself. Both Arizona and California have supplied the documentary
bona fides in a rather odd-but apparently valid-manner: by authorizing the applicant/
executing officer to fill in the blanks and affix the judicial imprimatur to a standard form,
all-purpose warrant that is carried in patrol cars. The Arizona statute is quite specific:
A. If the magistrate is satisfied that probable cause for the issuance of the warrant
exists, he shall issue a search warrant commanding a search by any peace officer of the
person or place specified, for the items described.
B. The warrant shall be in substantially the following form:
"County of
_
state of Arizona.
To any peace officer in the state of Arizona:
Proof by affidavit having been this day made before me by (naming every person
whose affidavit has been taken) there is probable cause for believing that (stating the
grounds of the application) according to § 13-3912, you are therefore commanded in
the daytime (or in the night, as the case may be, according to § 13-3917), to make a
search of (naming persons, buildings, premises or vehicles, describing each with reasonable particularity), for the following property or things: (describing such with reasonable particularity), and if you find such or any part thereof, to retain such in your custody subject to § 13-3920.
Given under my hand or direction and dated this
day of
-,
19(judge, justice of the peace, or magistrate.)"
C. The magistrate may orally authorize a peace officer to sign the magistrate's
name on a search warrant if the peace officer applying for the warrant is not in the
actual physical presence of the magistrate. This warrant shall be called a duplicate
original search warrant and shall be deemed a search warrant for the purposes of this
chapter. In such cases, the magistrate shall cause to be made an original warrant and
shall enter the exact time of issuance of the duplicate original warrant on the face of
the original warrant. Upon the return of the duplicate original warrant, the magistrate
shall cause the original warrant and the duplicate original warrant to be filed as provided for in § 13-3923.
Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3915 (1978).
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preference theory, rather than ignore it by judicial tolerance of a
wider spectrum of warrantless intrusions. Perhaps most important,
in supplying both the means and the encouragement for more commonplace resort to magistrates, we will return our attention to the
more appropriate consideration: the proper forms and circumstances for the issuance of judicial process to acquire inculpatory
evidence. Thirteen years ago, Professor Telford Taylor told us that
the fourth amendment had been stood on its head by cases incessantly poking around to discover the fourth amendment's meaning
concerning searches and seizures without warrant, when the provision actually was designed to delimit the warrant itself."' Professor
Taylor's teaching probably is discussed as often as any scholarly
expression on this subject," but until now, scant occasion arose for
the courts to journey down the true path of the framer's original
concern. That occasion may now be at hand, introducing a period
of increasing magisterial responsibility in the supervision of preaccusatory investigation. It is an aspect of the criminal process that
should be enlarged, developed, and improved.
IV.

CODA

If we are truly at the advent of a shift in judicial participation
in the acquisitory phase of the criminal process-from post facto
to ante facto-one would hope that the doctrinal profits will accrue well beyond the ex parte telephonic search warrant. In my
opinion, pressing issues bearing on court-ordered acquisitions have
been treated, at best, sporadically and discursively; real similarities
have been ignored and substantial differences blurred and the
whole endeavor left floundering without a unified imperative to
guide investigators and judges. This part of the Article touches
upon only two or three of these matters by way of example.
Particularly since the Supreme Court widened the way,63 the
subpoena duces tecum has become a more likely means for the acquisition of certain kinds of evidence from certain kinds of custodi61.

T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES

IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

(1969).

62. To date, eleven Supreme Court opinions and innumerable scholarly works on the
fourth amendment have discussed Professor Taylor's book.
63. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). In the past, prosecutors assumed that
a subpoena duces tecum addressed to a suspected custodian could be readily quashed on
grounds of privilege against the self-incrimination implicit in the production of the evidence. In Fisherthe Court instructed us that such protected testimonial communication was
not necessarily implicit in compliance, particularly when authentication was adduced from
another source.
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ans, whether or not they be "targets." Nevertheless, the subpoena
duces tecum remains an odd duck on the constitutional pond. The
Court has recognized the compulsory process to be an instrument
of search and seizure-albeit privately conducted-and, therefore,
within the proscriptive and prescriptive ambit of the fourth
amendment." As a practical matter, and particularly when documents are sought, the subpoena duces tecum often functions precisely as a search warrant, which, upon personal service, immediately produces the desired item. In operation, the devices may
differ only in the identity of the person who carries the evidence
downtown to court. Despite the common governing authority, however, and despite the occasional functional equivalence, an enormous difference remains both in the showing that the prosecutor
must make and in his obligation to make it in advance. In place of
the constitutional necessities of probable cause, reliable belief, precise description, and sworn commitment, courts issue subpoenas
duces tecum virtually at prosecutorial discretion, and the documents survive fourth amendment challenge if they are not "overbroad," commercially crippling, or mere "fishing expeditions." 5
Far from the exacting criteria for the conventional warrant, these
catch phrases cannot even rightly be termed standards; they are
nothing but placebos to the fourth amendment.
In light of the relaxed issuance of the subpoena duces tecum,
it may be surprising that some repositories claim the right to be
"searched" by subpoena before being subjected to a conventional
warrant." Though the motion to quash allows some contention
before compliance with the subpoena duces tecum-an opportunity that is lacking under the warrant procedure-that value must
surely be diminished by the paucity of restrictions on the use of
the subpoena. Perhaps what the repository really does not like is
the broad and indiscriminate search preceding the seizure when
the state executes a warrant either on an uncooperative source or
on one who is thought to be only partially forthcoming. If that is a
real problem, as it may well be (particularly in the quest for documents from commercial files) it points up another area of incoherence in current search and seizure law. Courts today recognize no
64. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541, 544 (1967) (dictum).
65. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
66. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 553 (1978).
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distinction between the ingredients of a warrant for the simple, superficial acquisition and one for the deep and destructive search.
One obtains a search warrant for stolen property in precisely the
same fashion if its execution entails opening a suitcase in the trunk
of a car as if it authorizes the dismantling of a house board by
board and plowing the grounds with bulldozers.6
This part of the Article concludes with the mystery of the
mired amendment proposed to rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the resultant gap for judicial filling. Davis
v. Mississippi8 probably brought the problem to the attention of
most commentators, but the situation is real and not uncommon.
Suppose a person or a known group is suspected of a crime for
which the only clue is a fingerprint or some other characteristic
requiring comparative examination of the suspect's or suspects'
person. Since no "testimonial or communicative" data are sought,
the fifth amendment privilege is not implicated. Some means
should be available to glean the evidentiary fact from the body of
the suspected person or persons. The Court has worked out a
rather awkward two-tiered analysis.6 9 It first considers the seizure
of the body to be examined to determine whether the former satisfied fourth amendment strictures. It then considers whether the
examination itself dealt with a probe for normally private attributes, such as blood types, 0 or only for those regularly displayed to
the public at large, such as voice timbre, handwriting, body size, or
facial configuration.7 1 If the search was of the private sort, a second

fourth amendment inquiry is required to see if an exception to the
warrant rule applies, as one does, for example, with fingernail deposits on a suspect about to clean his fingernails.7 2 A procedure for
67. In 1977, after the discovery of $17,250 of stolen cash that had been baked into
dishes of lasagna and stored in a garage freezer at a Suffolk County, New York home, a
court issued a search warrant permitting the Manhattan District Attorney's Office to dismantle the house and plow its grounds with bulldozers. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1977, at 23.
These efforts produced only great anger on the part of the couple who occupied the premises and prompted them to consider filing suit against the District Attorney. Id. The lawsuit,
however, apparently never came to fruition.

68. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
69. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (fingernail scrapings); United
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprints);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) (stomach pumping).
70. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1 (1973).
72. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
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preexamination process-a nice blend of the subpoena and warrant
modes-could well replace this awkward and slightly artificial post
facto inquiry. Just such a rule was drafted for the Federal Rules in
1971,18 but it has unaccountably languished on the congressional
back burner ever since. Some courts tentatively have experimented
with this idea in isolated cases and have experienced good results. 4
With well-drawn legislation, overdue judicial responsibility could
be created, based on simple process, to close the gap in the mechanism of acquisition.
V.

CONCLUSION

The good faith though mistaken belief of a searching officer
that his penetration into protected privacy is a legitimate situational response should save evidence found therein only if his error
is an error of fact. Courts should not be assigned tasks that cannot
be performed rationally. They should not be required to declare
whether a police officer reasonably could have misperceived operative law. Therefore, when the illegality results from the constabulary error of law, the good faith belief of the officer that the search
and seizure was lawful should be omitted from the equation. Apart
from what the ignorant but virtuous constable thought the law
countenanced, the lawfulness of his acquisitory conduct probably
should be judged by the standard of circumstantial reasonableness,
rather than by the familiar categorical measure. With a flexible
standard, courts can-and should-consider a greater variety of
factors, including the seriousness of the crime, the need for the evidence sought, the relative intrusiveness of the chosen probe, and
the permeability of the privacy barrier upon which the defendant
relies.78
When feasible, a judicial officer should make the decisions to
73. FED. R. CraM. P. 41.1, 52 F.R.D. 409, 462 (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments
1971).
74. Reported decisions are surprisingly scarce. The only reported case directly dealing
with serious bodily penetrations appears to be United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), in which the court permitted minor surgery to remove a bullet from defendant's
arm, against his wishes, after a hearing that was consistent with Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966). See also United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980) (ex parte
authorization of body cavity search held not violative of due process protections). Unreported examples probably are more numerous.
75. The American Law Institute favored the "flexible standard" in A MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 commentary at 406 (1975). See also Coe, The ALI
Substantiality Test: A Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REv. 1, 7
(1975). The proposed considerations are not precisely the same as those mentioned in text
but the approach is similar.
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search and to seize before the intrusion occurs. General adoption of
the telephonic warrant procedure, along with training and the
technology of ready and recorded access, should put magistrates on
the scene of many events that traditionally have been regarded as
specially exigent. As a matter of ordinary warrant routine, early
judicial supervision may become a more prominent part of American investigatory procedure. In addition to moving closer to the
fulfilment of the promise of the fourth amendment's warrant
clause, we may begin in earnest the search for a sensible, judicially
controlled, and unified theory for the preaccusatory acquisition of
evidence. Unbound by traditional distinctions between warrants
and subpoenas, and beyond the fourth amendment's four recited
elements of the valid warrant, we should turn our attention to the
appropriate degree and circumstances, judicially monitored, for the
intrusion of the hand of the state into the privacy of its citizens.

